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Introduction 
The events of summer 2011 in the UK provoked much debate within sociology and 
criminology (Bauman 2011, Gorringe and Rosie 2011, Jefferson 2011, Moxon 2011). This 
paper will compare and contrast the Bradford ‘riot’ of 7 July 2001 and the urban unrest in 
Greater Manchester on 9 August 2011. In particular, the focus is media representations of 
these two events and how and why urban disorder is presented as mindless and criminal. 
The main agents involved in this process are the Government and police, who actively 
label and define’ criminal’ behaviour and the media who have some influence on how this 
behaviour is understood by the public. Arguably “the culture and institutions of social 
control were as much part of the deviant or criminal phenomena as those who committed 
crime” (Hall et al 2013: xii). These institutions are concerned with the perpetuation of 
hegemonic values which serve the needs of the powerful.    
This article interrogates whether ‘in the moment’, or immediate media representations of 
disorder have changed in the decade between the two riots. Just as ‘Policing the Crisis’ (Hall 
et al 2013) was not primarily about why individuals become muggers or how to control 
mugging, the main focus here is  not on why people were rioting (as this only tells part of 
the story) but more importantly how English society reacted to the riots. Having said this it 
is useful to give some background information on both disturbances to put them in context. 
In the case of Bradford, race was an important factor.  This was just months before the attack 
on the World Trade Center, which resulted in increasingly divergent and antagonistic global 
media reports of the Muslim population (Spalek 2002, Abbas 2007). Racism was also a 
catalyst for the urban unrest in August 2011 due to the shooting dead of a young man, Mark 
Duggan of African-Caribbean descent by police in London. The Metropolitan Police’s poor 
response to requests from the local community for answers regarding this, led to looting of 
local shops in Tottenham, London (Solomos 2011). A failure of the Metropolitan police to 
mobilise enough officers in a timely fashion to the situation in Tottenham led to rioting in 
other parts of London and the following day across 22 boroughs including Manchester 
(Travis 2011). The Muslim extremist folk devil played no part in the events of 9 August 
2011 in Greater Manchester; rather media reports scapegoated ‘feral’ youth. This article 
explains the role of the police and politicians as primary definers (Hall et al 2013) of criminal 
behavior and the media as secondary definers (Mason 2009, Hall et al 2013) of events. A 
comparative analysis facilitates an answer to the question of how urban disorder media 
narratives/representations may have altered in the decade between the two events.   
 
The Creation of News Reports: Primary and Secondary Definers  
 
Often the media report on events outside the audience’s first-hand experience, therefore can 
be a key source of information and possibly influence. Journalists tend to write stories which 
they consider to be newsworthy, based on what they think will be of interest to their audience 
such as extraordinary events. According to Hall et al (2013) there are three aspects to the 
social production of news. These are i) the bureaucratic organization of media which creates 
types/categories of news stories, ii) the structure of news values which gives order or ranking 
of stories and iii) the construction of the story itself by the media so that it is comprehensible 
to the audience. The third aspect is important as “an event only ‘makes sense’ if it can be 
located within a range of known social and cultural identifications” (Hall et al 2103: 57). 
Making an event intelligible to the reader is a social process and assumes some sort of 
consensus within society. This consensus is based on the notion that we all have the same 
maps of meaning from which we make sense of the world around us. Language is an obvious 
part of the consensus, but having common cultural values is also important. “This view 
denies any major structural discrepancies between the different groups, or between the very 
different maps of meaning in society. This ‘consensual’ viewpoint has important political 
consequences […] It carries the assumption that we all have roughly the same interests in 
the society, and that we all have an equal share of the power in society” (Hall et al 2013: 58 
emphasis in the original). 
 
For Hall et al (2013) the focus is not on media ownership (which tends to be concentrated 
in the hands of a few powerful corporations) but on the way news is produced to serve the 
interests of the powerful, thus upholding the hegemony. Whilst journalistic values of 
objectivity, impartiality and balance exist, it is often the case that the media tend to rely on 
the opinion of authority figures or experts, such as politicians when reporting on political 
matters, or the police when covering crime related stories. These experts become the 
‘primary definers’ of news; they help establish what the ‘problem’ actually is and how it 
will be framed. They play an active rather than passive role. However, “the cohesiveness 
and uniformity of primary definers has been over-estimated, ignoring the tensions and 
competing discourses between them” (Mason 2009: 195). The media are secondary rather 
than primary definers of news as they do not decide what the ‘problem’ is, but do reproduce 
the views of powerful experts. Therefore, the media play a key part in the labelling process 
(Marsh and Melville 2011). Mason (2009) takes the Gramscian view that the press legitimate 
the existing social order, which maintains the dominant ideology. Hegemony may be 
challenged and subject to change so “consent must be constantly won and re-won” (Fiske 
1991: 291). Journalists act as mediators between experts and the ‘structured ignorance’ (Hall 
et al 2103) of the general public. Of course, the media also practice selectivity, so not all 
experts who are consulted will be included in a news story. This selectivity allows the media 
to transform their version of events to suit their readership.  
  
Crime as News and Scapegoats 
Crime is socially constructed and what constitutes a criminal act may change dependent on 
the era and context in which it occurs. Crime tends to be behaviour which crosses the 
boundaries of consensus and the law plays an important role in what constitutes a crime 
(Hall et al 2013). Violent crime tends to be (over) reported in the media and deemed the 
most newsworthy. Urban crimes such as rioting are considered newsworthy not only 
because they are violent, but also because cities are viewed as a symbol of civilisation and 
centres of capital wealth. “The ‘state of the city’ is, in a sense, the ‘tide-mark’ of 
civilisation” (Hall et al 2013 144).  
The process of identifying a folk devil (first popularised by Cohen (1972)) who carries the 
blame for all society’s ills is not a new occurrence. Anomalous groups are those who 
diverge from the hegemonic identity of white, middle class, middle aged and usually male. 
Unsurprisingly the antithesis of this (the black unemployed youth) is habitually 
constructed as deviant. One of the inconveniences of a postmodern society which 
celebrates difference and diversity is that difference is heightened and more conspicuous 
(Young 1999) potentially creating more folk devils. Paradoxically the proliferation of 
media also means “folk devils themselves are less marginalized than they once were 
(McRobbie and Thornton 1995: 559).  
Media representations of the urban unrest in Bradford focus on the folk devil of young 
Asian male, namely the Muslim extremist, scapegoated for being criminally blameworthy 
and socially problematic due to failure to ‘integrate’ (Massey and Singh-Tatla 2012). Since 
9/11, it is no longer ‘Pakis’ with different cultural practices who are the problem, but 
Muslims living by different and separate values (Kundnani 2007). In Bradford, the 
majority of the rioters were male and fitted comfortably with the image of the ‘gang’ 
member. As Alexander (2004) states: ‘reports up to, during and after the riots weave a 
picture of angry young men, alienated from society and their own communities, entangled 
in a life of crime and violence’ (2004: 531).   
In Manchester, ‘feral’ youth is identified as the folk devil. This label is not peculiar to 
Manchester. “In the less reputable parts of the British media rising rates of youth 
unemployment are attributed variously to laziness, lack of application and other personal 
failings” (McDowell 2012: 573). This combined with concerns around anti-social 
behaviour and provision within the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act to punish such behaviour 
(typically associated with working class teenagers) scapegoated young people for all the 
ills of society.  Historically, youth is a category represented with negative overtones 
(Furlong and Cartmel 1997). However, there is a paradoxical nature to cultural 
constructions of youth too, as Pain (2001) argues that young people can be simultaneously 
dangerous and vulnerable. Similarly, Males (1999) asserts that youths are a group society 
is afraid of and afraid for. In addition, young people have had the discouraging experience 
of attracting the label ‘anti-social’ (Goldsmith 2008). “Three decades ago in an earlier 
crisis Stuart Hall and his colleagues (1978) documented the rise of ‘the mugger’ as the 
quintessential hate figure for the media. Today the more generic replacement is a ‘feral 
youth’” (McDowell 2012: 573).  
Typical Media Riot Discourse 
The main commonality in both media discourses around ‘riots’ (and indeed the majority of 
riots) is that they are presented as irrational, mindless acts of violence. News rarely 
represents urban disorder as legitimate, rational, political protest. However, Waddington et 
al (1989) make two important points. Firstly, collective behaviour does not have to be 
rational or irrational but may in fact be both. Secondly, the social context of acts are 
significant; riots do not tend to occur without reason. ‘The model of a flashpoint combines 
reference to the antecedent conditions (the ‘tinder’) with a highlighting of interpersonal 
interaction (the ‘spark’)’ (Waddington et al 1989: 2). The ‘tinder’ is identifiable by 
observing the social and cultural conditions present in the UK.   
For the 2001 Bradford riot the ‘tinder’ included conditions such as inadequate resources, 
social grievances and lack of political representation for the local Asian community 
(Benyon and Solomos, 1987). The ‘spark’ (Waddington et al 1989) was a protest against 
forthcoming marches planned by extreme anti-immigration organizations and right-wing 
anti-Muslim groups the National Front (NF) and British National Party (BNP) (Macey 
2002, Bagguley and Hussain 2003, Kundnani 2007).  
There did not seem to be any obvious spark for the 2011 riots in Greater Manchester. This 
suggests unrest was ‘copycat’ behaviour (Wain and Joyce 2012) emulating rioting 
elsewhere in the country. Lea and Young (1982) argue it is the violence of the police, 
which sparks riots. The riots started in London where the shooting of Mark Duggan by the 
police provided a spark, but those rioting in Manchester were not necessarily protesting 
about this (Massey 2012). In terms of tinder Lamy (2012) argues the 2011 riots were a 
result of successive governments’ failure to deal with the social revolution (1960s) and 
economic revolution (1980s) resulting in increased individualisation and devastation of the 
social fabric. Other explanations for the 2011 urban unrest, riots or ‘disorder events’ 
(Home Office 2011) include consumer culture (Bauman 2011, Moxon 2011, Winlow and 
Hall 2012), economic inequalities (Grover 2011) and timid policing (Gorringe and Rosie 
2011). Having said this, the response by institutions (such as the state and media) rather 
than the causes of unrest are the main focus of this paper.  
In essence, urban unrest becomes politicised and abstracted from the local context. 
Following the 2011 riots political rubric described culprits of urban violence as the ‘feral 
underclass’ (Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State Ken Clarke) and ‘feral criminal 
underclass’ (Mayor of London Boris Johnson). Prime Minister David Cameron claimed that 
‘parts of society frankly are sick’. Here we can see ‘right-thinking’ people or moral 
entrepreneurs operating the moral barricades (Cohen 1972, Critcher 2003). These politicians 
act as primary definers (Hall et al 2013) of the riots by illustrating how far removed from 
‘civil’ and ‘right’ behaviour rioters have become. It is not in fact the act, which is deviant 
but society’s response to it. Hall et al (2013) argue crime and deviance are social constructs 
and any behavior challenging normative ideas about social order is classified as deviant. The 
British media has played a role in constructing a new underclass in recent years (Hayward 
and Yar 2006) yet this explanation is too simplistic as not all rioters were poor and not all 
poor populations are violent (Lamy 2012). However, Lea and Young’s (1982) liberal thesis 
argues riots are in fact, a revolt of the underclass: ‘the riots are not seen as acts of unbridled 
and uncivilized selfishness and criminal mindedness but as a collective demonstration of 
despair’ (Lea and Young 1982:6).  
 
Contextualising the riots: British society, culture and politics 2001-2011 
This section of the paper outlines significant shifts in British society in the decade between 
the two riots. The aim is to establish whether changes in government had any impact on 
media reports of riots.  Politically the Coalition Government replaced the New Labour 
Government (who came into power in 1997) in 2010.  The Coalition aimed to restructure 
the public sector within five years via austerity with profound retrenchment and cuts to 
public spending aiming to clear the national debt and reduce the role of the state (Taylor-
Goody 2011).   The introduction of welfare to work/workfare critics have argued, is 
tantamount to slave labour and the ideology behind workfare seems to be around indolence 
and a lack of motivation, rather than a paucity of real employment opportunities for young 
people, further stigmatising  the unemployed (Jordan 2013).  Those who are young and 
unemployed face double demonisation.  
In terms of policy and legislation, there are two noteworthy changes to regulations.  These 
are the introduction of the Anti-social Behaviour Act in 2003 and an increase in police stop 
and search powers. Some have argued the Anti-social Behaviour Act has simply 
criminalised many youth behaviours such as rowdiness, creating noise, being a nuisance, 
street drinking and vandalism (Squires 2008, Goldson and Muncie 2008).   
With reference to the media, the Leveson Inquiry brought into question the morality of the 
institution. The inquiry began in 2012 aiming to investigate firstly the role of the media 
and secondly the role of the police into the 2011 phone-hacking scandal.  The first part of 
the inquiry examined the ethics and culture of the press along with their relations with the 
police, the public and politicians. The inquiry is ongoing, as the second part of the inquiry 
regarding the police is pending at the time of writing.  No doubt, the outcome of the 
Hillsborough Inquiry in April 2016, which ruled police had unlawfully killed football fans, 
does not create a positive image of the police and may have an impact. The main 
recommendations were the press should continue to be self-regulated and a new body 
should devise a new code of conduct to ensure the public would feel confident complaints 
taken seriously (Leveson 2012). Whilst self-regulation of the media has been criticised it 
also allows British media independence from state intervention, thereby providing a 
balance between freedom and regulation (Brock 2014).  One major change in terms of a 
more democratic media has been the introduction of social media and social networks such 
as Facebook and Twitter. Though some have argued the role of Facebook in the Arab 
Spring was, overstated (Reardon 2012) it is credible to say such types of social media have 
the potential to bring like-minded people together and to fuel social movements.  Other 
online communication sites such as YouTube have the potential to provide alternative 
accounts of events to those presented in the mass media.   
Methods 
 
“Although the classic methods of ethnography are participant observation, listening and 
interviewing, any approach that assists the journey towards a detailed empirical knowledge 
of a particular ‘social world’ can be ethnographic: wading through mounds of newspapers 
(primary materials for the ‘social world’ of social reaction); reading masses of secondary 
material in the form of books, articles and commentaries” (Hall et al 2013: xi). This paper 
examines how media representations of riot have changed over the ten-year period between 
events, using thematic content analysis. In particular, whether a change in government has 
had an impact is key. The analysis draws on critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2010) 
and in particular language used to construct ‘folk devils’ (Cohen 1972) and ‘scapegoat’ 
(Young 1999) particular groups. Why the media and Government create scapegoats is a 
pertinent question, but arguably how this occurs is also gainful.  It is unlikely journalists set 
out, or intend to demonise certain groups.  Arguably the Government is looking for a 
‘blameworthy’ group to detract attention from themselves, whilst the media are looking to 
create ‘newsworthy’ stories by focusing on extreme incidences (such as a nine year old boy 
looting in 2011) leading readers down a particular path to assume this is ‘typical’ behaviour.  
Such themes and discourses ‘frame’ events in a particular way (Scheufele 1999). Discourse 
has three basic characteristics; it is related to the institutional context (in this case the media) 
in which it occurs, it has an impact on our identity and understanding of reality and finally 
it operates in an exclusionary way (Critcher 2003). Whilst the classic notion of a discourse 
analysis is not deployed, qualitative content analysis does identify culturally and socially 
located narratives. This paper builds on previous research (Massey and Singh-Tatla 2012) 
on media representations of the Bradford riot.       
 
Analysis of broadsheet, tabloid and online news sites was undertaken. The sample comprised 
articles gathered in the two-day period after each riot.  The intention was not to look at 
longitudinal accounts of events, but rather to examine the ‘in the moment’ immediate reports 
of each instance or urban unrest. As Young (2009) comments “what is disproportionate is 
the reaction to its immediate manifestation. It is proportional to the anxiety, not to the actual 
event” (2009: 14). This two-day window after each event meant the data was more 
manageable and comparable. In addition it allows an observation of immediate reaction to 
events highlighting ‘knee jerk’, reactions the Government. In total twenty news articles were 
anaIysed with ten reporting on the Bradford riot published between the 8th and 10th of July 
2001 and ten on the Manchester riot published between the 9th and 11th of August 2011.  A 
full list of newspaper articles utilized is available in the bibliography. The data was drawn 
from a newspaper database (Lexis Nexis) and news websites. Only regular news articles 
written by journalists were selected (rather than editorials, letters or op-eds) to strengthen 
the validity for comparative analysis. The national newspapers analysed constitute 86% of 
UK national daily newspaper circulation. Local newspapers were included for both riots 
with one report from the Manchester Evening News and one from the Bradford Telegraph 
and Argus. News media is not a monolithic entity, therefore, a reasonably wide selection of 
news reports was utilised to allow for ample analysis of the ideological and political gamut 
of British media. In addition, news media reproduces the hegemony (Hall 1980) and does 
little to challenge this or dismantle stereotypes. “News practices are inscribed by relations 
of power (and therefore the power to represent) with degrees of power in the hands of 
different groups within and outside the industry” (Poole 2002: 52-3). Those outside the 
industry include global business and commerce, political parties and powerful lobbies 
(Poole 2002).   
 
The aim was to look at pressing rather than long term media narratives.  This makes the 
reports on two events more easily comparable, however, it is important to remember at this 
stage very few facts were available and the underlying causes of events emerged over time. 
Manchester and Bradford are the two cities under investigation as both are deindustrialised 
and at least a quarter of both cities’ populations consist of BME groups (ONS 2013). Given 
previous media analysis of the Bradford riot (Massey and Singh-Tatla 2012) when the 
Manchester riot occurred it presented an opportunity to carry out comparative analysis. 
Much of the academic debate on the 2011 riots focused on the causes of it (Bauman 2011, 
Gorringe and Rosie 2011, Grover 2011, Moxon 2011). Wain and Joyce (2012) carried out a 
comparative analysis of the Manchester riots in 1981 and 2001, but this also focused on the 
causes of the disorder and made recommendations for future policing of riots. All of this 
indicates a paucity of comparative analysis of media representation of riots. We will now 
turn to the findings in order to establish whether the decade between the two events (which 
involved a change in government and the development of social media) made an impact on 
media representations of riots.     
 
Findings: Bradford Media Reports 
 
Primary analysis of newspapers revealed five recurring themes or issues in the texts.  These 
were mindless violence, racism, policing, the ‘localness’ of rioters and the British National 
Party/National Front.  Adjectives used to describe rioters included ‘mobs’, ‘common 
criminals bent on destruction’, gang members’, ‘racist thugs’, ‘yobs’, ’thugs’ ‘youths’ and 
‘gangs’.  Events are represented as ‘mindless violence and reckless destruction’, ‘pure 
thuggery’ and ‘savagery’. Bystander accounts in the Guardian newspaper included 
comments about ‘mindless people’ and ‘mindless idiots’ with ‘no justification’ for damaging 
property and innocent people. Politicians were quoted as condemning the riot as ‘simple 
thuggery’ (Tony Blair then Prime Minister quoted in The Daily Mirror 10/07/01) and 
‘wanton violence’ (David Blunkett then Home Secretary quoted in The Independent 
09/07/01).  Here we can see primary definers (Hall et al 2013) of events, making a judgment 
on those who have crossed moral boundaries (Cohen 1972).          
 
Racism and racial tension in the city were issues recognised by many newspaper reports. In 
particular poor race relations between the Asian population and the police. One resident 
interviewed by the Daily Mirror states ‘the young lads have only seen Asians being arrested 
and they’ve reacted’. The same article describes a racist attack on one white man by around 
twelve Asian men.  Another white man with ‘England’ tattooed on his back was also beaten 
to the ground according to a further article in the Daily Mirror 08/07/01.  The Sun newspaper 
reports similarly how ‘a dozen Asian attackers surrounded their white victim’.  It is 
interesting to note newspaper reports omit accounts where the attackers are white and Asians 
are victims. It seems neither group is blameless; it is difficult to ascertain which group (white 
or Asian youths) are the worst offenders.  Four reports portray whites as the attackers, three 
state that Asians were the attackers and two newspapers apportion equal blame to both 
groups. It seems multiculturalism in Bradford is far from unproblematic. Numerous media 
accounts, (which have many mutualities with official reports), counter pose ‘social 
cohesion’ to the supposed separatism of multiculturalism, as well as to the reality of 
segregation (Massey and Singh Tatla 2012). However, the BBC report these were not classic 
race riots but rather ‘socially deprived youths wanting a “bit of fun”’ (BBC 10/07/01). 
Whilst race is still an issue here the concern  seems to be about violent behaviour in general, 
rather than something attributed to any ethnic group in particular.  
 
Islamophobia is evident in one headline in the Daily Telegraph stating ‘Muslim Parents and 
Mosques are to Blame’.  Parents of Pakistanis (who are predominantly Muslim) are heavily 
criticised for not ‘taking control’ of their children and mosques are described as ‘training 
grounds for the Taliban’.  In addition, the Guardian describes Muslims as a ‘separate 
community’ who have not integrated as the Hindu, Bangladeshi and Sikh communities have. 
The news reports do not provide evidence of or scrutinise sources of segregation, but present 
it as an over-simplified ‘explanation’ for the riots, insinuating it is the Asian and Muslim 
population who are to blame (Bagguley and Hussain 2003).  The data analysed indicated the 
tabloid press had a tendency to show blanket hostility toward those actively involved in the 
disturbance by demonising them, while using selective and concise information about 
events.  The discourse here is that Muslims are the threat; the media presents them 
stereotypically as potential terrorists. Discourses suggest anyone associated with Islam has 
potential affiliation to extremist groups and therefore a ‘would-be bomber’ (Poole 2002). 
Unfortunately, “failing to make a distinction between Islam and Islamists has negative 
implications for all Muslims because it implies that the problem resides in the religion and 
in the people who follow it, rather than in alternative factors” (Poole 2002: 9).      
 
The policing of the Bradford riots was criticised both for being too heavy-handed and not 
harsh enough. In particular, there were concerns about the thirty-six arrests of which 
twenty-three were Asian and thirteen white, seemingly biased against the Asian population 
despite rioters being both white and Asian.  This is attributed to the long history of poor 
race relations between the Asian community in Bradford and the police. One article 
describes the police presence as ‘too small and underprepared’ (Independent 09/07/01).  
Indeed, police themselves admitted they were almost overwhelmed in a Daily Telegraph 
report. The Bradford Telegraph and Argus gives an account of riot police instructed to 
‘hold their line’ during clashes between police and Asian youths. According to the account 
it is actually an Asian elder who succeeded in dispersing the group of Asians by speaking 
to them in the early hours of the morning. Whilst the police faced criticism there is no 
narrative around them being a potential threat as a racist institution; instead, hegemony 
perpetuates the narrative of the white ruling elite.    
Half the newspapers mentioned the rioters were not necessarily local residents.  Given the 
local community suffered significant damage this would make sense and contradict the 
representation of rioters as ‘mindless’.  Despite this, one newspaper reported rioters as 
‘destroying their own community’, yet the same source also reported five local arrests.  
This is quite low considering there were thirty-six arrests in total.   One local Bradford 
resident interviewed by the Observer newspaper stated ‘there are just a handful of people 
from Bradford involved.’  However, another argues the violence was not caused by 
outsiders (The Observer 09/07/01). Ultimately, it is in the interests of the media to portray 
the rioters as local, because the act of damaging their own community is more mindless.          
Media views on right-wing extreme groups instigating the riots are mixed. ‘No provocation 
offered last Saturday justified the orgy of violence and destruction that followed. There was 
no Fascist march’ (The Daily Mirror 10/07/01). Here, The Mirror neglects to acknowledge 
the widely publicised threat of such a march, and the gatherings of racist groups in the city 
(Massey and Singh Tatla 2012). Overall most newspapers assigned some blame to the neo-
fascist presence. Bagguley and Hussain (2003) argue right-wing groups are denounced to 
some extent, nevertheless there are other deeper-rooted problems as right wing groups have 
been in existence for several decades and riots have rarely broken out in the past. Clearly, 
extreme right-wing groups acted as a spark for the Bradford riot, however, other issues 
including multiculturalism, (‘reverse’) racism, unemployment, and (self) segregation cannot 
be ignored (Massey and Singh Tatla 2012).  Primary definers or ‘experts' then labelled the 
urban unrest as ‘wanton’ and morally wrong. Consequentially media reports portray the 
Muslim population, rather than right wing extremists, as the identified threat. The mass 
media presented this group as mindless, violent and holding radical Islamic views. The 
solution lies with the Asian community to integrating into existing British society.    
 
Findings: Greater Manchester Media Reports 
 
Primary analysis revealed four dominant themes or discourses. These were yobs/out of 
control youth, mindless violence, police struggling to cope and vengeful punishment of the 
rioters.  This headline from the Daily Mail sums up the way youth is represented in many of 
the media reports: ‘Child looters’ rampage: How rioters as young as nine pillaged 
Manchester City Centre’. In fact whilst a large number of rioters were under the age of 21 
the majority of them (53 per cent) were aged 22 and above as illustrated in Table One below.    
 
Age in years  Percentage of Manchester  
rioters 
18-21 43% 
22-25 17% 
26-34 20% 
35+ 20% 
Table One: Age of Manchester rioters (adapted from Clarke 2012) 
 
Other sources describe young people as ‘feral’ and words such as ‘rampage’ and ‘prowled’ 
highlight the alleged wildness and animalistic behaviour of those involved in the disorder.  
It is interesting to note the implication is of having a mindless mob mentality, yet Le Bon 
(1952) argues crowds have ‘collective mind’. Research conducted after the riots by the 
Guardian and LSE (2011) found that rioters in Manchester (and London) described 
themselves as ‘one big gang’ during the urban unrest.  
 
The disorder in Manchester involved looting and it seems youths did not fear punishment 
with one stating in the Daily Mail ‘the prisons are overcrowded – what are they going to do, 
give me an ASBO?  I’ll live with that’. A number of media reports used quotes from 
Assistant Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, Gary Shewan who described events 
as ‘Wanton acts of violence and criminality’ in The Guardian. In the same report, Shewan 
added ‘these are pure and simple criminals running wild tonight […] they have nothing to 
protest against.  There has been no spark’.  A bystander interviewed by the Manchester 
Evening news agreed: ‘nothing in Manchester has happened to provoke this behaviour’. 
Interestingly it seems that whilst the crowds of rioters were violent no one was actually 
injured.  Also, the official statistics for recorded crime in Greater Manchester indicate that 
only 13 per cent of crime came under the category of ‘violence against the person’ with the 
majority of crime  categorised as acquisitive or criminal damage (Home Office 2011). Here 
we can see youths stereotypically portrayed as violent and mindless, yet the ‘facts’ tell a 
different story in terms of actual injuries and instances of violent crime.  
 
The low numbers of police officers present at the Greater Manchester riots as reported by 
the media was because Greater Manchester Police (GMP) had sent reinforcements to 
London in order to deal with disturbances in the capital. Inadequate policing of initial urban 
unrest in London may be due to rioting being unexpected, or insufficient numbers of officers 
being available. The fact that then Prime Minister David Cameron, Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg, Mayor of London Boris Johnson, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne 
and Home Secretary Theresa May were all away from London on holiday cannot have 
helped matters. Whilst Sir Hugh Orde (President of the Association of Chief Police Officers) 
claimed the return of senior ministers from holiday was ‘irrelevant’ (Newburn 2011) the 
crisis was controlled more effectively once senior politicians returned. Meaningfully reports 
of the disorder in London had focused on police failing to control rioters, resulting in those 
involved in subsequent copycat riots (Wain and Joyce 2012) expecting little police 
intervention. One BBC news headline said ‘Police ‘overwhelmed’ by riots in Manchester 
and Salford’. Police were criticised by a local Labour MP Graham Stringer who thought the 
Chief Constable of GMP had ‘a lot to answer for.’  It is interesting to note the blame 
apportioned to the police here for events. Other descriptions of events use language such as 
‘struggling’ and ‘overwhelmed’ to describe the police as they were outnumbered by ‘gangs’ 
of rioters. Arguably, the sheer numbers in attendance at the riots provoked anxiety (Tuan 
1979).  Crowds are even more threatening when they are organized (Rude 1981) in this 
instance by new social media.  There is evidence Blackberry Messenger (BBM) helped to 
muster crowds (Ball and Lewis 2011, Baker 2011).           
 
The notion of harsh punishment for involvement in urban disorder is clear in a quotation 
from Assistant Chief Constable Terry Sweeney who said in the Daily Mirror ‘we will not 
allow such mindless criminal damage and wanton violence to go unpunished and we will 
arrest and prosecute anyone found to be involved in looting or acts of criminal damage’.  A 
discourse around justice was also prevalent with the emphasis on the number of arrests made 
and continuous targeting of offenders.  The actual number of arrests made varies from one 
media source to another with the Mail Online reporting 113 arrests, the Manchester Evening 
News announcing 47 arrests with more to follow (a figure corroborated by The Guardian).  
Home Office data (2011) indicates that in Greater Manchester 581 recorded crimes occurred 
with 326 arrests made evidencing an arrest rate of 56% rather contradicting the zealous 
promises made by police in the media. It was not solely teenage youths who were at risk of 
prosecution according to the Mail Online a police source said “we have information that 
children of primary school age were out on the streets.  Charges of neglect could be brought 
against any parent if their young children are found on the streets in the midst of a civil 
disturbance”.  As the riots occurred during school summer holidays, it is not truancy which 
is an issue, but rather poor supervision or parenting. Here we can see blame being placed on 
parents rather than their offspring. A solution to the problem is also emerging in the form of 
retribution, justice and harsh punishment. The Government and police act as primary 
definers (Hall et al 2103) as they label the riots as mindless criminal damage and wanton 
violence. The media as secondary definers (Hall et al 2103) reproduce this view using 
adjectives such as ‘feral’, wild and violent. Having crossed the moral boundary the solution 
for these deviants is punishment, the harsher the better.  
 
Comparative Analysis of Bradford 2001 and Greater Manchester 2011 
When comparing the two episodes of urban unrest there are some similarities in media 
representations.  Despite being ten years apart it seems little has changed in terms of news 
reporting given the creation of ‘folk devils’ (Cohen 1972) was evident in both events, though 
it is noteworthy the two folk devils were different as will be discussed later. News reports 
of both events used identical adjectives for those involved. These include thugs, youths and 
gangs. The word victim(s) appears in media reports with reference to local businesses and 
people. The language authorities such as politicians and the police use both in 2001 and 
2011 is almost identical. The phrase ‘wanton violence’ occurs repeatedly and there is 
mention of ‘simple thuggery’ and ‘simple criminals’. This suggests the thuggery was either 
mindless or straightforward; either way it does not require explanation according to the 
authorities.  However, research conducted on the riots by the Guardian and LSE states  
‘rioters identified a number of other motivating grievances, from the increase in tuition fees, 
to the closure of youth services and the scrapping of the education maintenance allowance.  
Many complained about perceived ‘social and economic injustices’ (Guardian and LSE 
2011: 5).  
 
With reference to race and ethnicity, data on those arrested (see table two) indicates the 
majority of those arrested in Greater Manchester were white in contrast to those arrested in 
Bradford who belonged to BME groups. Finally, parents face blame (in part) for both riots. 
 
Ethnicity   Bradford  
(adapted from Bagguley and 
Hussain 2003) 
Greater Manchester  
(adapted from Home Office 
2011) 
White  4% 77% 
BME  96% 23% 
 
Table Two: Ethnicity of those arrested for rioting  
 
In the case of Bradford, parents have lost control of their offspring particularly Muslim 
parents. In Manchester, it is parents of children, rather than youths, whose parenting skills, 
are questionable as some of those involved in the urban disorder were of primary school age 
(under eleven years old).  
 
One of the differences in the reports is the consequences for these parents, as those in 
Manchester face the threat of charges of neglect by GMP. There is no mention of punishment 
for parents in Bradford, though this could be because the rioters in Bradford are older. A 
much more punitive discourse exists around events in Manchester with a definite promise 
of harsh sentencing for those involved. As previously, mentioned one rioter in Manchester 
encountered by the Daily Mail did not feel threatened by an ASBO. GMP were keen to 
proclaim they would not allow mindless criminal damage to go unpunished and delivered 
their promise by holding 24 hour magistrate courts to process those arrested. One tentative 
finding here is the Coalition Government wanted to give the impression of handing out harsh 
punishments. Research indicates that harsh sentencing for rioters is common, as riot 
sentencing remarks by the judiciary are usually negative, regardless of the rioters’ level of 
participation (Lowenstein 2016). In terms of sentencing, there was a ‘new vindictiveness’ 
(Jefferson 2011) towards those involved in the disorder, with harsh sentences being given.  
One twenty two year old male received two years and nine months imprisonment for 
burglary and twelve months apportioned to a twenty five year old male for handling stolen 
goods (Manchester Evening News 2011). These sentences may appear excessive, but in 
comparison to those given to the Bradford rioters which include a twenty one year old male 
facing four years and nine months for hurling two stones and a twenty two year old receiving 
eight and a half years for hurling a petrol bomb at police line (Allen 2003) they seem 
relatively lenient. These observations are only cursory as it is difficult to compare the two 
events, as the Bradford riot did not appear to involve looting. 
  
In terms of the violence of the police (Lea and Young 1982) being a factor there is a history 
of poor race relations between police and local communities in both cities.  However, it is 
difficult to blame violent policing in Manchester, as the police presence was so low.  In 
addition, timid policing and low numbers of officers on the streets (Rosie and Gorringe 
2011) during initial rioting in London led others in disenfranchised areas to believe they 
would not face punishment for rioting. Having said this, historically public/police relations 
have been dubitable.  Jefferson (2011) argues the police who are often criticised for being 
too hard on rioters were, instead castigated for being too timid during the 2011 urban 
disorder.  This approach was short lived though as after the unrest 450 detectives were 
deployed to hunt down offenders across England (Jefferson 2011), indicating a return to 
punitive measures.  Police are framed as ‘struggling to cope’ in 2011 and feeling ‘almost 
overwhelmed’ in 2001. After the 2011 riots Sir Dennis O’Connor in a report to a Commons 
Home Affairs Select Committee recommended that police use tactics which allowed police 
to advance and disrupt rioters, rather than more traditional ‘stand, hold, protect’ techniques 
typically used to police protests (Travis 2011).  
 
Another similarity was the way the media constructed events as acts of criminality while 
emphasising  the role of ‘gangs’ and the urban underclass (Solomos 2011).  Those in Greater 
Manchester would arguably easily fit into the category of ‘angry young men’ (Alexander 
2004) engaged in lawless violence activity and marginalised by society.  However, it is 
noteworthy that whilst the word ‘gang’ did appear in media reports official statistics show 
that only five per cent of those arrested in Greater Manchester had any kind of gang 
affiliation (Home Office 2011). The term ‘gang’ is often misused (Ralphs et al 2009) and 
applied in a haphazard way to  groups of youths whether they actually belong to a criminal 
gang or not.  
     
Few positive reports of young people emerged in the initial media reports on events in 
Manchester, however, post-riot the report of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel 
acknowledges  ‘More young people were involved in the clean-up operation than the riots 
themselves – however, media reports generally did not reflect this’ (Riots Communities 
and Victims Panel 2012). This report also highlights evidence provided to the Leveson 
Inquiry by the Youth Media Agency, which emphasised the persistently negative 
representations and discourses about young people in media reporting of the 2011 
disturbances (Giner and Jones 2012).  In reality young people are diverse and neither 
wholly law abiding nor totally criminal. Whilst in Bradford rioters were described as 
young (Macey 2002, Alexander 2004) and arguably out of control, there was little 
evidence of children being actively involved in the disturbances.  The youngest age 
mentioned in reports on Bradford was fourteen. In Manchester some reports acknowledge 
‘children as young as nine’, creating both anxiety around a loss of childhood innocence 
and increased dangerousness (Males 1999, Pain 2001) regarding minors. This discourse 
concerning ‘feral’ youth and the moral overtones accompanying it was absent in reports of 
incidents in Bradford.  However, in both cases parents are blameworthy whether it be 
those of Muslims in Bradford or young children in Manchester.  Members of the local 
community (whether they be parents or youths) are framed more frequently in these 
newspaper reports as ‘offenders’ rather than ‘victims’.  Where the rioters came from, 
particularly whether they were local is one of the key issues in the reports on Bradford.  
There was an emphasis on the majority of those involved in events being outsiders.  One 
explanation for this could be the Anti-Nazi league (ANL) meeting/rally that took place 
immediately before the riot.  This attracted a high number of Asian attendees.  In the 
reports on Manchester, there is no mention of the disturbances attracting individuals from 
other cities.  A final difference in reporting of events in Greater Manchester was the 
inclusion of quotes and opinion from rioters.  Meanwhile, not one of the reports from 
Bradford included any comment from those actually participating in the disturbances 
(Massey and Singh Tatla 2012).   
 
Conclusion 
This paper has provided an analysis of media discourses concerning urban disorder in 
Bradford in 2001 and Greater Manchester in 2011.  The presence of young people is 
evident in both accounts, though arguably there is more concern  around the alarmingly 
low age of those implicated in the Manchester disturbances than the ‘angry young men’ 
(Alexander 2004) embroiled in the Bradford ‘riot’.  Also the ‘rioters’ are comparable in 
terms of their economic status, as all those involved were living in areas of multiple 
deprivation.  The inclusion of the word ‘gang’ is apparent in media accounts of both 
events.  This overused word in the media is shorthand for large groups of predominantly 
young people and ‘gang’ has criminal connotations (Ralphs et al 2009).   The main 
common media discourses were mindless violence, the demonisation of youth and a sense 
that the police felt overwhelmed.   Those blamed or scapegoated (Young 1999) for the riot 
were predominantly Asian/Muslim youths in Bradford and feral youths in Manchester.  
The ‘problem’ here is unruly youth rather than police tactics or politicians failure to 
address widening inequalities in society. Indeed, in the case of the 2011 riots whilst the 
majority of senior ministers being on holiday at the time of the riots is mentioned, no 
blame is apportioned to them, nor are they held account for what seems to be irresponsible 
behavior. In London alone the cost of the riots was £300 million (Dodd 2011). Is there any 
other  organization which would allow so many senior staff members to all take leave 
simultaneously, return to events costing millions and still expect to be employed? Why 
were the government not held to account for their actions? One answer is that as primary 
definers of crime they would obviously not draw attention to their immoral actions (as this 
would undermine their credibility and power) and with the assistance of the Press events 
are ‘framed’ in a particular way. “The media thus help to reproduce and sustain the 
definitions of the situation which favour the powerful, not only by actively recruiting the 
powerful in the initial stages where topics are structured, but by favouring certain ways of 
setting up topics, and maintaining certain strategic areas of silence” (Hall et al 2013: 67).     
 
We can see that despite there being ten years and significant institutional change between 
these events not much has changed in terms of the way the media reports on urban unrest.   
There were some differences though as race did not seem to be a motivating factor in 
Manchester.  Nor did the media report on where the rioters in Manchester had come from, 
whereas in Bradford there was an emphasis on outsiders causing the trouble.  Whilst 
retribution and vengeful punishment was dominant in the 2011 reporting this is absent in 
2001.  However, the actual sentences handed out for offences in each city tell a different 
story.  It would be enlightening to conduct more in-depth statistical research on the 
sentencing process of both riots. 
 
The lack of obvious spark (Waddington et al 1989) makes it easier for primary definers of 
deviance (politicians and police) to present events as ‘mindless’. Technological changes 
have placed social media centre stage in the ten-year period between these two events, 
giving young people a voice on social network sites such as Twitter and Facebook.  This 
may be why young people’s views were included in the 2011 discourse.  However, in spite 
of the nominal provision of a voice for the ‘perpetrators’ of the Summer 2011 disturbances 
the descriptions and media representation of those involved in this and the earlier Bradford 
unrest are incredibly similar. The decade between the two riots was not a static period, 
with a change in national government, significant changes to legislation, an inquiry into 
the practices of the news reporters and a rise in social media.   Notwithstanding these 
changes the narratives around the reporting of disorder remains stagnant.   
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Open Peer Review Comments 
 
1. This article focuses on the coverage that was devoted by the national and local press 
to riots that occurred in Bradford in 2001 and Manchester 2011. Using moral panic 
theory as its framework of analysis, it evaluates the response of the selected media to 
these events. It also considers issues that may have caused these events to occur - 
although the focus of the article is response to rather than causes of these disorders. 
  
2. The article is well-research and coherently argued throughout. The focus on localised 
media representation provides the work with originality and, overall,  the arguments 
presented are consistently put forward within the selected conceptual framework. The 
conclusion (and in particular the last paragraph) is strongly argued. There clearly are 
other conceptual frameworks within which to evaluate riots (especially that of 'unruly 
politics') but the chosen model that focuses on response and the rationale of response 
is perfectly legitimate. 
  
3. There are perhaps some areas where more detail / elaboration would be useful.The 
abstract refers to the intention to consider why a moral panic is deployed and by 
whom. Overall, the article does address this issue but I feel the timing and desired 
intention of 'launching' a moral panic might be more fully evaluated. Additionally, 
the point that is always made regarding media representation of events of this nature 
could be referred to - was the media reflecting as opposed to manipulating public 
fears about these events and those involved in them ? 
  
4. The term 'feral youths' is referred to - I think this term could usefully be defined in 
the context of those who participated in these events. 
  
5. The point is made regarding Greater Manchester that the key issue was shortage of 
numbers. I am not sure it was - I feel the main issue (subsequently identified by Denis 
O'Connor) was that of rioters' tactics (ie 'flash mobbing') that made traditional police 
tactics against rioters redundant (ie they were designed to confront static crowds). 
  
6. A few very minor points: the abstract refers to harsh punishment being a feature of 
events in 2001 - should this be 2011 ? Reference is made to the 2003 Anti-social 
Behaviour Act - would it not be better to refer to the 1998 Crime & Disorder Act that 
'created' the ASBO ? Page 10 refers to parents losing control of parents - should this 
be 'children' ? The reference to Le Bon in the bibliography should be 1898 when the 
work was written ? 
 
7. But overall, a useful addition to the literature that deals with contemporary urban 
disorders. 
 
Peter Joyce 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
 
 
 
1. There are typographical errors here that need to be corrected before publication. In the 
first reference, for example, ‘Moxom’ should be ‘Moxon’. 
2. There are problems with grammar and syntax throughout the essay. I think the essay 
should be read through carefully and edited before being published. 
3. The author acknowledges that events in London – particularly the killing of Mark 
Duggan – prefaced the looting and disturbances in Manchester in 2011. However, the 
author offers no explain of how and why these events in London led to events in 
Manchester. 
4. The early sections assume that ‘moral panic’ is an appropriate analytical framework 
before it has been established as such. It would be best to be objective in the early sections 
and withhold any endorsement of moral panic theory until the theory has been described 
and assessed. 
5. I believe the rioting in Salford had a slightly different character to the rioting in 
Manchester city centre. I believe this merits acknowledgement. 
6. The author claims that ‘Historically, youth is a category represented with negative 
overtones (Furlong and Cartmel 1997)’. This may be true, but youth sociologists tend to 
lean in the opposite direction. The entire history of youth sociology is inflected with 
celebration and romanticisation. I think it would be useful to acknowledge that ‘young 
people’ are actually quite diverse, and while the political right’s demonization of ‘young 
people’ is a distortion of reality, it is a distortion quite similar to the liberal left’s 
celebration of ‘young people’ as being creative and politically progressive.   
7. This discussion of youth begs the question: what proportion of rioters can be categorised 
as ‘young’? Didn’t adult men predominate? 
8. ‘“Ideologies of protest from Marxism to contemporary feminism and the simultaneous 
spread of systems of psychiatric, psychological, criminological, and sociological systems 
of “knowledge” have all produced “authorities” who claim to know better than the people 
themselves the reasons for acts of common or uncommon violence in everyday life.” 
(Brass 1996: 1). This quote seems to have been dropped in at random. It needs to be 
contextualised. I also encourage the author to think of what’s missing here. Aren’t we, 
criminologists, holders of expert knowledge? Why should we assume that ‘the people’ are 
imbued with some natural ability to explain ‘common or uncommon violence in everyday 
life’? 
9. The author identifies a number of conservative politicians who demonised rioters, and 
usefully reproduces some of their reductive rhetoric. However, the author also tends to 
assume that these stupid proclamations spurred a ‘moral panic’. Were ordinary people 
across the country genuinely thrust into a panic? Did they listen to Boris Johnson’s inane 
ramblings and the suddenly rise up to demand concerted political action to punish the evil-
doers? The application of moral panic theory should be done carefully. 
10. Generally, I think the section in which moral panic theory is described and applied 
needs to be firmed up. 
11. The author mentions ‘feral youth’ and positions feral youth as a folk devil, but didn’t 
much of this discourse in fact demonise the parents of supposedly disorderly young people 
rather than the young people themselves? 
12. The author claims that ‘Why the media and Government use moral panic is a pertinent 
question’, but no answer is offered. The ‘answer’ is to be found throughout the moral panic 
literature. The clearest exposition can be found in Hall et al’s Policing the Crisis.  
13. One of the central planks of moral panic theory is the assumption that Britain possesses 
an essentially conservative moral order, and that the political class remain dedicated to 
defending moral boundaries. However, after 40 years of neoliberalism, can British society 
still be considered ‘conservative’? Isn’t liberalism the ruling ideology today? Haven’t 
politicians actively sort to liberalise and update the stuffy modern social order?  
 
In conclusion –  
I think the findings are interesting, but moral panic theory is deployed in a haphazard and 
unconvincing way. I think the literature review sections and the conclusion need to be 
firmed up.    
 
Simon Winlow  
Northumbria University 
Author Amendment Synopsis 
The framework for analysis has been changed from moral panic theory (which both 
reviewers found problematic) and more specifically uses Hall et al’s (2013) primary and 
secondary definers of news outlined in ‘Policing the Crisis’ as a theoretical approach, to 
unpack and analyse media representations of both ‘riots’. 
The literature review section has changed quite significantly. Originally it had a section 
‘Moral Panic and Scapegoats’ which has been replaced by ‘Crime as news and 
Scapegoats’ and an additional section: ‘The Creation of News Reports: Primary and 
Secondary Definers’ which outlines Hall et al’s (2013) model of news production.  
The article has been thoroughly proof read and edited to ensure any 
typos/spelling/grammatical errors have been corrected.  
Whilst the article does mention Greater Manchester as an area (which includes Salford) the 
newspaper articles analysed only focused on events in the city centre of Manchester. 
Therefore urban unrest in Salford and how it may have differed in character to riots in the 
city centre are not deemed relevant to the argument presented here.   
Page 3 - reference is made to the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act which was where the term 
‘anti-social behaviour’ was first used before the introduction of the Anti-social Behaviour 
Act 2003. Also on page 3 an explanation of how events in London led to events in 
Manchester, which could be categorised as ‘copycat’ riots. 
Page 8 – a table has been included with data on the age of Mancunian rioters which 
illustrates the majority were adults.  
On page 11 a reference has been included to a change in police tactics identified by Dennis 
O/Connor post 2011. Also on page 11 it is acknowledged that young people are quite 
diverse and there is a discussion of their positive actions in the clean-up campaign post 
20011 riot. It is also noted that parents as well as children were criticised/held responsible 
for the behaviour of those in both riots.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
